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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is under § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Issues:
1.

Does Appellant, Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. ("Lakeside"), have any
legal right to take Farmington, Utah real property (the "Farmington
Property") from Renee Evans ("Renee") to satisfy Lakeside's judgment
against her husband, Dan Evans ("Dan")?

2.

Did the written 1989 Trust Agreement create three valid trusts: the DaRe
Family Trust, Dan's trust (the "Daymond Trust") and Renee's trust (the
"Revans Trust")?

3.

Did the 1989 Deed of transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee as
trustee and sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust, violate the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act?

4.

After 1989 did Dan retain authority over property in the Revans Trust?

5.

After 1989 did Dan have a present vested legal or beneficial interest in the
Farmington Property or any other property held in the Revans Trust?

6.

Did a 1997 resignation or removal of Dan as a trustee of the Revans Trust
constitute a transfer in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act?

7.

Did the trial court err in granting Summary Judgment to Renee?

3

Standard for Review:
The case of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65; 52 P.3d 1190 f7, established a clear
Standard of Review in matters of appeal of Summary Judgment:
When reviewing the trial court's ruling in a motion for summary
judgment, we consider all facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We
review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness,
according no deference to that court's legal conclusions. In addition,
we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon below.
(Citations omitted.)
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue Presented for Review:
Appellant objected to trial court's Order1 of summary judgment.

That Order

incorporated the trial court's own AMENDED MEMORANDUM.2
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. STATUTES RULES and CASES
INTERPRETATION OF WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
This matter has raised no constitutional issue. Statutes need not be construed,
as this matter may be determined upon the wording of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Certain cases are cited herein but Appellant has no reason to believe that this
matter rises to the magnitude that requires interpretation of any case of central
importance.

1
2

Record, 01706
Record, 01708-01729
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
Dan and Renee purchased the Farmington Property on July 29, 1986.3
On March 6, 19894 the Farmington Property was transferred to Renee Evans
("Renee") in accordance with the provisions of Dan and Renee's 1989 written Trust
Agreement.5 A Deed of transfer to Renee was signed, sealed and delivered on March 6,
1989. That Deed was recorded on March 10, 1989.6
It wasn't until ten years later that Lakeside first brought this action against
Renee to take the Farmington Property away from her in an attempt to satisfy Lakeside's
judgment that it had just then recently obtained against Dan.
Course of Proceedings:
On March 10, 1998, Lakeside obtained Judgment against Dan in the State of
Arizona.7 On June 16, 1998, Lakeside filed its Arizona Judgment in Utah as the basis for
bringing this present action against Dan and Renee in Farmington, Utah.
Lakeside claims that what Dan and Renee did in 1989, ten years earlier, violated
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because the 1989 transfer was made for the intent
to hinder, delay, and defraud Lakeside.

3

Record, 01259, line 7
Record, 00463
5
Record, 00362
6
Record, 00463
7
Record, 00184

4

5

Lakeside also claimed that it had a cause of action against Renee, claiming that in
the 1989 Trust Agreement Dan retained vested rights of ownership in the Farmington
Property sufficient to nullify the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed of transfer.
Attempting to rely upon the case of Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987), Lakeside asked the trial court to set aside a ten-year old Trust Agreement and
Deed or to find one or both the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed to be defective.
Lakeside's claim is that the wording of the 1989 Trust Agreement and Deed of transfer
left Dan with an interest upon which Lakeside could levy judgment against Renee.
Lakeside's objective was to take the Farmington Property away from Renee to
satisfy Lakeside's newly obtained personal Judgment against Dan.
The trial court ruled against Lakeside and entered its Order denying Lakeside's
claims.8 Consequently, Lakeside filed this Appeal.
Disposition in the Court Below:
The trial courts opinion and Order was that:
1.

The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust.9

2.

The 1989 Deed, being signed by both Dan and Renee, constituted a transfer
of the Farmington Property to Renee in trust under the Revans trust.10

3.

Dan and Renee's 1989 actions did not violate the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act.11

8

Record, 01706, Order
Record, 01716, last paragraph
10
Record, 01717, lines 11-12

9
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4.

The 1997 Amendment only clarifies language in an already valid trust and
makes no substantial changes reflecting "actual intent" to hinder delay, or
defraud Lakeside as a creditor of the Dan.12

5.

Dan "is a beneficiary" of all three trusts.13

6.

Dan, although a beneficiary, has no power of revocation.14

7.

Dan is entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing him from the case as
to the issue of fraudulent transfer of property interests to Renee.15

8.

On November 22, 2000, the trial court dismissed all of Lakeside's alleged
causes of action against Renee personally,16

9.

The trial court ruled that Renee is entitled to summary judgment dismissing all
claims against her in her capacity as trustee as they pertain to the transfer of
the Farmington Property to Renee by Deed and under the provisions of the
1989 Trust Agreement that created the Revans Trust.17

10.

Renee is also entitled to summary judgment dismissing all claims against Dan
as they pertain to the transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee by Deed
and under the provisions of the 1989 Trust Agreement that created the
Revans Trust.

11

Record, 01726, lines 8-11
Record, 01726, lines 18-20
13
Record, 01720, lines 18-19
14
Record, 01724, line 3
15
Record, 01728, lines 17-19
16
Record, 01713, lines 10-12
17
Record, 01728, lines 6-9
12

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dan & Renee —Background
1.

In 1984 Dan was employed as District Sales Manager for Trusswall

Systems, Inc., headquartered in Dallas Texas.18
2.

Dan's District Sales Manager position required extensive travel in

California, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada.19
3.

Subsequently, Dan worked for Action Wholesale Truss, living mostly in

Las Vegas.
4.
Mortgage.

On December 4, 1986, Dan and Renee borrowed money from Cache
A Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note against the Farmington Property

secured that loan. Dan and Renee bought the lot and built their own home on the lot,
The Trust Deed Note obligation was for $57,000.00.21
5.

Dan continued employment outside Utah, living in Las Vegas,22 while

Renee lived in the home that he and Renee had built on the Farmington Property.23
6.

Renee has been employed in retail sales and secretarial work since 1973.24

7.

Before 1992 Renee was employed at the women's clothing store in Salt

Lake City named Classy Lady.25

18

Record, 01227, lines 4-16
Record, 01227, lines 4-14
20
Record, 01228, lines 1-21
21
Record, 01258, line 22 through 01259, line 11
22
Record, 01228, lines 22-23
23
Record, 01228, lines 22-23
24
Record, 00264, paragraph 7
19
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8.

In 1992, after Dan got E.S. Systems established and operating in Nevada,

Renee moved to Nevada to live with Dan.26
9.

They purchased a condominium in Henderson,27 a suburb of Las Vegas.

10.

During Renee's absence from Utah, Renee had a daughter, her sister-in-

law and brother-in law occupied the Farmington Property.28 They maintained the home
and paid the utilities.29
11.

Living in Las Vegas, Renee worked as a secretary at E.S. Systems.30

12.

After E.S. Systems failed, Renee"s employment was at the Chevron Credit

Union in North Salt Lake.31
13.

On June 26, 1992, Dan organized and began managing E.S. Systems L.C.

("E.S. Systems"),32 a roof truss construction business33 that he located and operated in
Las Vegas, Nevada until 1998.34
14.

Renee held no management position or ownership in E.S. Systems.35

15.

E.S. Systems engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of both

commercial and residential roof truss systems in Las Vegas, and grew to attain annual
sales of six to eight million dollars.36
25

Record, 01166, lines 16-22
Record, 01228, lines 22-25 and 00265, paragraph 8
27
Record, 01218, line 22 through 01219, line 8; and 01225, lines 2-17
28
Record, 01190-01191 and Record, 00265, paragraph 8
29
Record, 01191-01192
30
Record, 01167, lines 19; Record 01168, lines 1-5
31
Record, oll65, lines 11-19 and 01168, lines 16-19
32
Record, 00068
33
Deposition of Dan Evans, 12/7/2000, Record, 01222, lines 15-16

26

9

16.

Lakeside Lumber Products ("Lakeside"), an Arizona company, provided

lumber products to E. S. Systems: Lakeside later required that Evans sign a personal
guarantee dated September 20, 1996.
17.

In 1998 E.S. Systems filed Bankruptcy in Nevada.38

18.

On May 27, 1997, Lakeside filed actions in Arizona against E.S. Systems

and against Dan personally.39
19.

On March 10, 1998, Lakeside obtained judgment against E.S. Systems and

a personal Judgment against Dan in Arizona.40
20.

On March 10, 1998, Lakeside filed its Arizona Judgment against Dan in

Utah. Lakeside also filed its Complaint against both Dan and Renee before the Second
Judicial District Court in Davis County.41
21.

Lakeside's Complaint sought to take the Farmington Property away from

Renee to satisfy its personal Judgment against Dan by alleging that Dan and Renee had
conspired to commit civil fraud against Lakeside as a creditor of Dan. 42
22.

In Dan's first deposition taken by Lakeside in Las Vegas, responding to a

question of any interest he may have in the Revans Trust, Dan said:43

34

Brief of Appellant, page 11, paragraph 38
Affidavit of Renee Evans, Record, 00264, also see Record, 01167, lines 18-19
36
Brief of Appellant, Page 10, paragraph 34
37
Record, 00145-00146
38
Deposition of Dan Evans, 12/7/2000, Record, 01222, lines 17-19
39
Record, 00148
40
Record,
41
Record, 00168
42
Record, 00001-00009

35
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23.

Dan:
Mr. Bullock:
Dan:
Mr. Bullock:

I don't have any ownership in it." * * *
Who is the beneficiary?
My wife I believe.
Are you a beneficiary?

Dan:

Not that I know of. I don't know. I don't believe so.

The trial judge permitted extended discovery, argument and hearings over

a period of more than three years, beginning on June 16, 1998 through April 2, 2001,
permitting additional time for discovery as Lakeside requested, including additional
depositions. Under that extended discovery granted by the trial court, on December 7,
2000, Lakeside again took the deposition of Dan Evans.44 On the same date Lakeside
also took the depositions of Renee Evans45 and Loren D. Martin.46
24.

At his second deposition in Salt Lake City, Dan was asked at if he had

paid any expense, maintenance costs or utility fees for the Farrnington Property since
June of 1997. Dan said "No."47
25.

Dan was also asked what he did with his paychecks after 1998. Dan said,

"I cashed them"48 and gave the cash to Renee49 because I didn't "have a bank
account."50 When Dan was asked, "Are you looking for a job now?" He said, "Yes."51

43

Record, 00187, lines 6-7 and Record, 00188, lines 6-11
Record, 01207
45
Record, 01157
46
Record, 01280
47
Record, 01233
48
Record. 01234, line 3
49
Record, 01234, line 4
50
Record, 01234, line 9
51
Record, 01233. line 6
44
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26.

At her deposition in Salt Lake City Renee was asked what assets she had
i

in 1989. Renee responded, saying that, "My only asset was the home, my house,"52 the
Farmington Property.
27.

Renee was questioned extensively as to her interest in the Farmington

Property, leading to its final questions in which Lakeside pointedly challenged Renee's
ownership and title to The Property, her home:
Mr. Bullock:
Renee:
Mr. Bullock:
Renee:

You claim because this is your trust for your benefit - That's my trust. That's my home that's in my trust. And I
own it. That's what I state.
Individually?
Individually. [Whereupon Renee's Deposition Ended.]

Dan and Renee's 1989 Creation of the Three Trusts
28.

Three years prior to organization of E.S. Systems, Dan and Renee created

three Trusts within a single written Trust Agreement.54
29.

On March 6, 1989, by written Trust Agreement55 and funding documents,

Dan and Renee created and funded three separate trusts,56 a Family Trust, Dan's Trust
and Renee's Trust.
30.

Dan's Trust (the "Daymond Trust") was funded with items of personal

property. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, the Daymond Trust exclusively held
all right, title and interests in the property held under the Daymond Trust.57

52

Record, 01197, line 11
Record, 01200, lines 18-23
54
Record, 00362-00387
55
Record, 00364-00385
56
Record, 01188, lines 9-11
53
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31.

Renee expressly waived all interest in all property held under the

Daymond Trust, "including community property interest and separate

property

interests therein."58
32.

And Dan continued his employment.59

33.

Lakeside has brought forth no evidence that Dan could not or did not pay

his debts after his 1989 transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee. Consequently,
Lakeside's allegation that Dan was insolvent in 1989 fails, remaining as unfounded and
unproved speculation.
34.

Renee's Trust (the "Revans Trust") was funded with items of property.

Upon funding, among the Revans Trust exclusively held all right, title and interest in the
Farmington Property.60
35.

And Renee continued her employment.61

36.

A Quitclaim Deed, transferring The Farmington Property into the Revans

Trust, was signed, sealed and delivered on March 6, 1989.62
37.

On March 10, 1989 that Deed of transfer to Renee was recorded.63

38.

Thereafter, Renee held exclusive right, title and interest, both legal and

beneficial, in the Farmington Property.64

57

Record, 00385
Record, 00363, lines 6-8
59
Record, 01228, lines 1-21
60
Record, 00384
61
Record, 01166, lines 16-22
62
Record, 00463
63
Record, 00463
58
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39.

Dan expressly waived all interest in property transferred to the Revans

Trust, "including community property interest and separate property

interests

therein."65
40.

Lakeside has brought forth no evidence that Renee could not or did not

pay all her debts after 1989.
41.

And Renee continued her employment.66

42.

The 1989 Trust Agreement67 provided that:

Separate Trust. Each Grantor reserves and grants to the other the right
and power to alter, amend, or revoke this Agreement, with respect to his or
her separate trust, in whole or in part, at any time and from time to time
without the consent of Trustee or any other person.
43.

Initially,68 from 1989 and until June 20, 1997,69 Dan and Renee were both
70

trustees of the Revans Trust.
44.

On June 20, 1997, Renee amended the Revans Trust,71

45.

On June 20, 1997, Renee also caused a second document to be signed,

sealed, delivered and recorded; giving public notice that Dan was no longer a
trustee.

That document stated that, "The purpose of this document is to reflect

Record, 00384
Record, 00363, lines 8-11
Record, 00264, paragraph 7
Record, 00391, paragraph 4
Record, 01453
Record, 00Record, 00391, paragraph 4
Record, 00441-00461
Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22
14

that Daniel R. Evans, was no longer a trustee/ 7

A copy of that document is

included in the Addendum. 74
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The 1989 Trust Agreement and Transfers Between Dan and Renee:
The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust. 1989 Deed constituted
a transfer of title of the Farmington Property to Renee in her capacity both as trustee
and beneficiary.

The merger of authority of trustee and beneficiary constitutes a

transfer of all right, title and interest. After the 1989 transfer the Farmington Property
was hers. The 1989 Deed of transfer was not revocable by Dan. Dan's clear intent
expressed in the Trust Agreement and the Deed of transfer to Renee was to transfer full
title of the Farmington Property to Renee. Dan has no authority to call it back.
Lakeside has argued that in the 1989 Trust Agreement, Dan retained authority to
revoke and amend the DaRe Family, thereby causing a revocation of the Revans Trust
and return of the Farmington Property to him. Lakeside's theory is that if Dan could
somehow revoke the Trust Agreement then Lakeside, acting through Dan, may have the
same right, including the right to revoke all three trusts and nullify the Trust Agreement.
Yet Lakeside has failed to argue that Dan had authority to nullify a specific
written, signed, sealed, delivered and recorded Quitclaim Deed under which he
transferred of all rights, both legal and beneficial, in the Farmington Property to Renee.

Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22
Record, 01255, lines 13-24; and Record, 01177, line 22
15

But revoke the Trust Agreement and the Deed would still stand. The law does not
require that an agreement and transfer in trust must be reduced to writing.
Lakeside has failed to cite any facts or law upon which to rest its claim of legal
authority to overturn established case law that holds that Renee's interest obtained in
the Farmington Property in 1989 at that time constituted a presently vested interest.
Lakeside has also chosen to ignore that in the 1989 Trust Agreement Dan had
expressly waived all right, title and interest to the Farmington Property.
Lakeside also tries to skirt another major issue — the Four-Year Statute of
Limitations under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. The limitation on bring an action
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is four years. So even if Dan's 1989 transfer
to Renee did violate the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, ten (10) years earlier is
unquestionably beyond the four-year statute of limitations. Lakeside's allegations in
regard to what happened ten-years ago are untimely and barred.
Lakeside cannot in good faith claim that in 1989 Dan or Renee conspired to
defraud Lakeside. That is because in 1989 Dan and Renee did not even know that
Lakeside existed. Lakesides' attempts at any such claim against either Dan or Renee
cannot be brought in good faith. Mere speculation or accusation without facts or law
does not constitute reasonable extension of the law or evidence Lakeside's good faith.
In 1989 Dan and Renee didn't even know that Lakeside existed. That being the
case, what basis in law or fact would now support any allegation that in 1989 Dan and
Renee conspired to defraud Lakeside. The 1989 transfer could not violate the Uniform

16

Fraudulent Transfer Act as to Lakeside as a creditor. Lakeside didn't even exist. If
Lakeside's arguments were to prevail no statute of limitations would ever run on any
transfer, even under business law where property is often transferred to or between
corporations, business trust, limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
In a nutshell, Lakeside is asking this Court to effectively open the door to any
unknown future creditor, giving that unknown future creditor or claimant the right to
litigate any previous transfer made by any person. It may even be argued that what
Lakeside is attempting to do is to use the courts as if the courts would unwittingly
concur in giving all creditors the power to litigate everything forever. That must not be
permitted because granting power to litigate is power to destroy.
Finally, the 1997 removal or resignation of Dan as a trustee did not constitute a
transfer. Before Dan resigned or was removed, Renee held both legal and beneficial
interest. After Dan's resignation or removal, Renee remained holding both legal and
beneficial interest in the Farmington Property. Nothing changed. Consequently, any
argument that there was a 1997 transfer must fail.

17

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
The 1989 Trust Agreement created a valid Revans Trust.
The validity of a trust is an issue of law to be reviewed for correctness. Flake v.
Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, %
The well established law of trusts followed in Flake v. Flake, at ^jl 1, is that,
A trust is an arrangement for the ownership of property. The nature of
the arrangement is such that the legal title of the property is held by the
trustee, but the benefit and enjoyment of the property resides with the
beneficiaries. It is well settled that [a] trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the [legal record]
title to the property is held [the trustee] to equitable duties to deal with the
property for the benefit of another person [the beneficiary], which arises
as a result of a manifestation [by the settlor, or trustor] of an intention to
create it. [Emphasis added.]
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Trusts fi 2 (1959)). There must be an intent by
the settlor to confer a beneficial interest in the property in some other
person. To create an inter vivos trust,
[a] settlor must have an intent to create a presently enforceable trust, . .
• the trust property must be clearly specified and set aside, . . . and the
essential terms of the trust must be clear enough for the court to enforce
the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust relationship.
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1981) (citations
omitted).
"A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the
benefit of beneficiaries." Cont'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club
Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Trusts fi 2 (1959)). The trustee has exclusive control of the
trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust
instrument, and "once the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the
owner of the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is
18

expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (citalion omitted). A
trust must have an identifiable beneficiary who is capable of enforcing the
equitable duties of the trustee. The transfer of property interests to the
beneficiaries "cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a
provision of the trust instrument . . . ." George G. Bogert & [***12]
George T. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees 6 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983).

Both Dan's and Renee's 1989 actions that in creation of a 1989 Trust Agreement
and Deed of transfer met all of the requirements of Flake and Sundquist.
Acting as a settler in 1989, Dan executed a written Trust Agreement and Deed of
transfer. Execution of the Trust Agreement, the Deed and the facts of this case leave no
doubt of Dan's intent. Dan's intent in 1989 was to transfer all legal and beneficial right,
title and interest in the Farmington Property to Renee.
Joining with Renee in creating the Revans Trust, Dan evidenced his intent in
writing and with his signature on the Trust Agreement and his signature on the Deed —
signed, sealed, delivered and recorded. Dan's intent is clear. Dan's intent was to
transfer all right, title and interest in the Farmington Property to Renee.
The Farmington Property was clearly set aside and transferred to Renee by a
recorded Deed.
The essential terms of the Trust Agreement and establishment of the Revans
Trust and the transfer by Deed of the Farmington Property are clear enough for the
courts to enforce, even against Dan.

19

After the Deed was recorded in 1989 the Property was Renee's. Renee held both
legal and equitable title. After 1989 Dan had no right under law or authority of any kind
to take the Farmington Property back or to transfer it from Renee to anyone else.
Lakeside has failed to bring forward any basis under law or fact that it has any
right to the Farmington Property superior to Dan's. Lakeside has never made any claim
that it has any contractual right to the Farmington Property except through its judgment
against Dan. In other words, if Dan cannot get it back neither can Lakeside.
POINT 2
Lakeside's accusation that Dan and Renee concealed the 1989
transfer is false, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
Lakeside states in its Brief that it,75
Brought its claim of action against Dan Evans within one year of the
Plaintiffs discovery of the transfer of the Farmington Property to the
trustees of the Revans Trust. The transfer was discovered by Plaintiff in
March of 1998. Plaintiff within three months of this discovery filed the
complaint and served the complaint on Defendants. Plaintiff met the time
limitation of Utah Code Ann. §25-6-10(1) (1995) by bringing its action
within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably
have been discovered by Plaintiff.
As a matter of law, any such inference or allegation is false. Transfer of the
Farmington Property in trust to Renee was made in 1989. The Deed of transfer was
signed, sealed, delivered and recorded as a public document in 1989. As a matter of law
the recording of the Deed that transferred the Farmington Property to Renee constitutes
notice to all, including Lakeside.

75

Any claim or inference otherwise is just false.

Appellant's Brief, page 48, lines 24-26
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Lakeside knew or must have known that there is no basis in fact or law to make any
such allegation.
Making any such allegation flies in the face of the well-established state of the
law. See: Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, at 52; 287 (Utah 1996)
The creditors claimed that the statute did not begin to run until they
had actual notice of the facts constituting the fraud. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at
1197. We held that the creditors would have discovered the conveyance
had they conducted a normal search of property upon which to levy when
they received their judgment against the debtor. Id. Lacking allegations
that the debtor had concealed the deed effecting the fraudulent
conveyance, we held that the creditors were on constructive notice of the
conveyance, and therefore its fraudulent nature, because "the means of
knowledge were available" to the creditors.
It is not an unreasonable extension of the law to impose the same standard of due
diligence and obligation to inquire upon Lakeside. There is no evidence that Lakeside
ever asked Dan for any credit statement or asset disclosure before extending its credit.
Any attempt to answer why Lakeside made never asked for a credit report or made
any inquiry as to Dan's assets will only lead to speculation.

But, maybe there is

someone within the Lakeside organization that may have just dropped the ball and is
just trying to use this extended and expensive litigation to cover his or her tracks. Who
knows?

Maybe this action is nothing more than just following Lakesides written

company policy.
But it is certain that the 1989 recorded Deed speaks loudly against Lakeside's
accusation that either Dan or Renee concealed the 1989 transfer.
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The fact is that when Lakeside demanded that Dan sign a personal guarantee or
belatedly discovered that it had no personal guarantee, Lakeside made no inquiry and
completely neglected its obligation of due diligence. What Lakeside is trying to do is
blame Dan and Renee for its own neglect.
The Fraudulent Transfer Act prohibits and provides a remedy for malevolent
intent to defraud. Inherent in the nature of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is the
prohibition against "actual intent" directed toward some real, immediate, imminent,
imminently anticipated, perceived or envisioned creditor.

The Uniform Fraudulent

Transfer Act does not apply either forever into the future are in favor of an unknown
and entirely unanticipated potential future creditor.
POINT 3
Resignation or removal of a Trustee does not constitute a transfer.
Resignation or removal of a Trustee of property held in trust does not constitute
a transfer. The Farmington Property was transferred to Renee in 1989. The 1989 Trust
and Deed to Renee did constitute a transfer to Renee in trust.
But neither a 1997 recorded document or any of the 1997 acts of Dan nor Renee
constituted a "transfer" as defined under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
The written text of Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UCA 25-6-2(12), does
specifically define a transfer:
25-6-2. In this chapter:
* * *

(12) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
22

asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. [Emphasis added.]
Resignation or removal of a Trustee in trust does not constitute a transfer of title
in real property any more that the resignation of removal of a President of a corporation,
General Partner or Manager of a limited liability company. Resignation or removal of the
Trustee, General Partner, Manager or a President does not effectuate a transfer of title to
property held in trust or under a State of Utah or any other State business franchise
governed under law.
Finally, Lakeside's major difficulty is that it has no case unless it can somehow
avoid the four-year statute of limitations imposed by law under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act. But in Lakeside's attempt and underlying Lakeside's arguments, there
appears to be a broad brush claim that any person who makes any attempt to limit
personal liability is committing fraud under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in
continuum and forever after against any future creditor. But if such were the law there
would be no corporations. In fact, history reflects that the same argument was once
used against corporate organizations and business trusts.
It just may be appropriate at this moment to slightly modify and paraphrase the
famous quote from the 1934 tax case opinion authored by Judge Learned Hand. Judge
Hand wrote that,76 "No person is required to so arrange their affairs in such a manner as
to make themselves the most vulnerable to the vicissitudes of life."

The "quote" from Judge Hand is substantially changed for this present situation.
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The Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 25-6-2(12) UCA, defines the word
"Transfer."
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. [Emphasis added.]
Appellant's claim is that Dan's June 20, 1997, removal or resignation as a trustee
constituted a "Transfer". It appears from the record that Lakeside is doing nothing
more that attempt to expand upon what was a trial court error.
POINT 4
Renee's June 27, 1997 Amendment of the Revans Trust and her removal or
the resignation of Dan as a trustee did not constitute a transfer.
Dan and Renee's 1989 Trust Agreement provided that:
Property held as "The Revans Trust" is the exclusive property of Renee
Poulsen Evans and Daniel Raymond Evans hereby expressly waives all
interests, including community property interests and separate property
interest therein.
In expressly waiving all interest in the Farmington Property contained in the
Revans Trust, Dan waived his right to revocation of the Revans Trust. The rule of
estoppel, if necessary, must be applied should Dan ever look to claim otherwise.
To the contrary, as a trustee Dan accepted and is bound by his duty as a trustee
to defend and protect the corpus of the Revans Trust for the benefit of Renee.
Lakeside, having no right superior to Dan's, may claim no legal right or duty
other than that held by Dan.
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Lakeside has no right to claim any greater authority or less responsibility to
protect Renee as she is the sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust.
Under the 1989 Trust Agreement and 1989 Deed of transfer, Renee received a
"presently vested interest" in the Farmington Property in 1989. From that moment the
Deed was signed, sealed and delivered, Renee held both legal and beneficial title. From
that moment to the present the Farmington Property has been hers. Renee was and is
the sole beneficiary of the Revans Trust. In arguing otherwise, Lakesides must ignore
the principles of two previously cited and controlling cases of recent date: Flake v.
Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589; and Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65; 52 P.3d 1190.
CONCLUSION—RELIEF SOUGHT
Recognizing that Lakeside had previously obtained judgment against Dan Evans
in Arizona and that such judgment had been previously filed with the Second Judicial
District Court, it is prayed that the Court of Appeals enter its ruling that this matter be
remanded to the Second Judicial District Court directing that:
1.

This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of

action, as to Renee Evans in her capacily as trustee of the DaRe Family Trust, the
Daymond Trust and the Revans Trust;
2.

This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of

action, as to Renee Evans personally;
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3.

This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of

action, as to Dan Evans in his capacity as trustee or former trustee acting under
authority of any provision of the 1989 Trust Agreement;
4.

This matter be dismissed upon the merits with prejudice, no cause of

action, granting Dan partial summary judgment dismissing him from any matter related
to the issue of transfer of the Farmington Property to Renee; and
5.

That the trial court conduct such other and additional proceedings and

enter such additional orders as the trial court may deem just.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2004.
LOREN D.MARTIN, PC
Counsel for Appellee
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orney at Law
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two copies of the bound version of the foregoing Appellee's
Brief was lodged with the Court of Appeals and placed in the US Mail, postage prepaid
on the 17thday of August, 2004, addressed to:
Bullock Law Firm
353 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Kimberly A. NeillAParalegal
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QUIT CLAIM DEED
DANIEL R. EVANS and RENEE EVANS, grantors of Bountiful. County of Davis, State
of Utah, hereby QUIT CLAIM to Dan R. Evans and Renee Evans Trustees of THE REVANS
TRUST, dated the 6th day of March, 1989, grantee of Davis County, Utah, ix the sum of Ten
and 00/100 (S10.00) DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following
described tract of land located at 138 East Paracle Circle, Farmington, Davis, County, State of
Utah, more particularly described as:

oi-on-ooo£
All of Lot 5, HIGHT SUBDIVISION, according to the offidal plat
thereof, on file and of record in the Davis County Recorder's Office.
THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE(S) HAVE FULL RIGHTS TO SELL OR EN CUMBER
Tl IE PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN.
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this 6th day of March, 1989.

STATE OF Utah
County of Davis

)
%%
)

On the 6th day of March, 1989. personally appeared before me DANIEL R. EVANS and
* RENEE EVANS thesigners of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thkt they
executed the same." *•

My Commission csp
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State or ursn
Department of Commerce
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Gary R. Hansen
Oivtslon Oi rector

ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
OF

E.S. SYSTEMS, L.C.
A Utah Limited Liability Company
Organized under the Laws of the State of Utah

The undersigned persons, each being more than eighteen years of age, hereby establish a
limited liability company pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, and adopt the
following articles of organization:
A. The name of the limited liability company is E.S. SYSTEMS, L.C.
B. The period of duration shall be thirty-five (35) years.
C. The limited liability company is organized for any legal and lawful purpose pursuant to the
Utah Limited Liability Company Act
D. The address of the registered office of the limited liability company is 138 East Parade
Circle, Farmington, Utah 84025. The name of its registered agent at such address is Dan
R. Evans.
E. The director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is appointed the agent
of the limited liability company for service of process if the agent has resigned, the agent's
authority has been revoked, or the agent cannot be found or served with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
5 !5
X
'xj

Management of the Company is vested in a Manager. The Manager is: Dan E£ Evans; 1 3 8 ^ —.
East Parade Circle, Farmington, Utah 84025.
• • Si ^
[T]
Dated June t&

. 1992

Dan R. Evans, Manager,
Attorney-in-Fact for all Members

*U

Dan R* Evans, Registered Agent
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corporation, aa duJy appointed
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TruatM under Deed of Truat harein-aftar referred t o , having raceiveil fro*
holder of the obligaticna thereunder a written request to reoonvey, reciting
that a l l sums secured by Mid Deed of Truat have bean fully paid, and Mid Deed
of Truat and the note or notM secured thereby having been aurrendend to Mid
TruatM for cancellation, does hereby FBOCNVEr, without warranty, to the person
or persona legally entitled thereto, the aetata now held by i t thereunder.
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Description:
ALL OF LOT 5 . MICHT SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO TBI O m C l A L P U T THDUTOF, Of
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GUARANTY AGREEMENT

In consideration of Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc., and any of its subsidiaries or affiliates
(hereinafter "Lakeside Lumber") advancing credit to E.S. Systems, L C . (hereinafter "Debtor"),
and also in consideration of Lakeside Lumber entering into other transaction of any kind with
Debtor, with or without security, the undersigned, (hereinafter called "Guarantor"), does
hereby guaranty and agree to pay Lakeside Lumber, upon demand, all obligations of Debtor
to Lakeside Lumber, including all past and future attorney's fees, and breaches of warranty
arising from transactions between Lakeside Lumber and Debtor.
The liability of Guarantor shall be unlimited. This guaranty shall continue until Lakeside
Lumber shall receive from the Guarantor notice of revocation, which revocation shall be
effective only as to subsequent obligations or transactions between Debtor and Lakeside
Lumber.
This guaranty is absolute and unconditional, and shall take effect immediately upon its
execution by the Guarantor. This guaranty shall be enforceable as a primary obligation of the
Guarantor without Lakeside Lumber first having to pursue any of its remedies against the
Debtor. The undersigned hereby waives notice of acceptance hereof, notice of any
transactions between Debtor and Lakeside Lumber, or of any other charge or liability of
Debtor to Lakeside Lumber, and further waives presentment, demand, protest, and notice of
protest, or notice of default. Guarantor authorizes Lakeside Lumber to renew or extend the
time for any guaranteed payment or obligation, to deal with the Debtor without notice to the
Guarantor, and without the Guarantor's consent, in all respects at Lakeside Lumber's
discretion, without affecting Guarantor's obligations hereunder. If Lakeside Lumber hires an
attorney to enforce the terms of this guaranty, Guarantor shall pay reasonable attorney's fees
incurred; if legal proceedings are filed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney fees incurred in both the trial and appellate courts.
Nothing contained in this guaranty agreement, or any action taken to enforce the terms of this
guaranty shall constitute a waiver of any claims, lien rights, or other remedies Lakeside
Lumber may have against the debtor, or any third party.
In the event the Guarantor is a corporation, each of the persons executing this agreement on
behalf of the Guarantor covenant and warrant that they are duly authorized to execute this
Guaranty on behalf of the corporation, and that the corporation is duly authorized to execute
this guaranty. In the event there is more than one Guarantor, their liabilities under this
agreement shall be joint and several, and the revocation or release of any liability under this
agreement as to one Guarantor shall not affect the liabilities of the other Guarantors. In
construing this agreement, the singular shall include the plural and the plural shall include
the singular. It is understood and agreed that this guaranty is delivered in the State of
Arizona and shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of Arizona.
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Dated this

day of $J^2$

Mr. Dan R. Evans, as an individual
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QUITCLAIM DEED
Dan R. Evens and Rence Evans, acting as Trustee of THE REV ANS TRUST dated March 6,
1989. grantor of Farmington, County of Davis, State of Utah, nereby QUI TCLAIMS to:
Rence Evans, Trustee of
THE REVANS TRUST,
dated March 6,1989, as amended June 20,1997,
grantee of Davis County. Utah, for the sum of Ten and 00/100 (S10.00) DOLLARS and other
good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land located at 138 East Parade
Circle. Farmington. Davis County, State of V;Jh, more particularly described as:
All of Lot 5. Higiu Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, on file and of
record in ;»u- Davis County Recorder's Office
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(The purpose of this document is to reflect that Daniel R. Evans no longer serve* as a trustee.)
THE GRAMOR AS TRUSTEE AND THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES) »VA\E FULL FCW-* A\X*
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TO PROTECT, CONSERVE, SELL, LEASE, ENCUMBER, OR OTHERWISE MANAGE .\ND Pt3rO* E CV l. PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN.

WITNESS rhc hand of said grantor on June 20U593^

Dan R. Evans, Trustee (former)
STATE OF UTAH
Tounty of Salt Lake

\ Evans, Trustee

)
SS.
)

On June 20. 1997, personally appeared before me Renee Evans, Trustee, and Dan R.
Evans. Trujtee (former), the signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to mc
that they executed the same.
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